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Focus Group Follies? 
Qualitative Research and British Labour Party Strategy1 
 
 
Abstract:  Media coverage of the contemporary British Labour party routinely suggests party 
leaders, notably Tony Blair, have been overly reliant on using focus group as a means of 
obtaining voter feedback. The paper explores this popular understanding by considering how 
and when qualitative forms of opinion research began to play a significant role in developing 
campaign strategy. Following their incorporation into party planning during the mid-1980s, 
focus groups provided an increasingly influential (and at the time more discreet) source of data 
and support for the leadership's Policy Review later that decade. Following the 1992 election 
defeat selective findings from the party's qualitative research programme became integral to 
the public relations' initiatives of Labour's self-styled 'modernisers', particularly in their 
largely successful attempt to delegitimise and then marginalise the role of the party's once 
formidable affiliated union supporters in internal affairs. Crucially this contributed to a 
climate that enabled the key moderniser Tony Blair to emerge and win the leadership. 
 
 
 
 
Dr Dominic Wring 
Department of Social Sciences 
Loughborough University 
LE11 3TU 
E-mail D.J.Wring@lboro.ac.uk 
Tel 00 44 (0)1509 228350 
Fax 00 44 (0)1509 223944 
 
 
Biography: Dominic Wring is this Journal’s Associate Editor for Europe.  
He is also Vice-President of the International Association of Political 
Science’s Research Committee on Political Communication and co-
convenor of the United Kingdom Political Studies Association’s Media 
and Politics Group 
 
Keywords:  British Labour Party, focus groups, public opinion, agenda-
setting, electoral strategy 
 
 
                                                 
1 The author would like to acknowledge and thank the British Academy and the UK Political Studies Association 
for their support 
 2 
Focus Groups and ‘New’ Labour. 
It has become a journalistic truism that Tony Blair and ‘new’ Labour are obsessed or motivated by focus 
groups.  This is perhaps understandable given the influential role of Blair’s polling adviser Philip Gould in 
shaping party strategy.  The latter’s influence was discernible during the preparations up to the 1997 election 
when the campaign preparations were informed by NOP polling data and the 300 focus groups conducted by 
Gould.  A further 70 were undertaken after the election was called (Butler and Kavanagh,1997,129-30).  This 
feedback underpinned the entire plan contained in the party’s so-called ‘war book’.  Its identified 'swing voters' 
included 'mortgage holders, younger, higher incomes' and reflected a guiding strategic assumption that the 
party should focus its greatest efforts on appealing to the middle-class or those aspiring to join it (Labour 
Party,1997).  The report noted other potential target groups such as women, people nervous about change 
and those less likely to vote and suggested campaign themes designed to contrast Labour with the 
Conservatives including leadership, attractive policies and ‘something for all people’.  The leadership’s 
rhetorical emphasis on ‘new’ Labour helped offset perceived weaknesses identified in the report including 
public distrust of the 'hidden left', 'unions' and 'inexperience'.  Blair attempted to counter these perceptions 
and the Conservative’s ‘New Labour, New Danger’ slogan by pledging in the right-wing Daily Mail newspaper 
that he would keep the 'most restrictive' labour laws in the western world (Daily Mail, 26th March 1997).  The 
manner and scale of the party’s return to office muted criticism of this approach and appeared to vindicate the 
leadership’s investment in a highly stylised professional campaign approach based at its new corporate style 
Millbank headquarters.   
 
The importance of focus grouping to the new Prime Minister continued to excite journalistic attention 
throughout the government’s first term.  Philip Gould’s largely secretive role and work as an advisor literally 
became front page news when several of his private memos to Blair were leaked to journalists with The Times 
and Sun and used by Conservative leader William Hague to attack Labour in parliament.  It was somewhat 
ironic then that an editorial in the Sun, one of those media most feared by party strategists, should criticise 
Gould for a ‘pessimism’ derived in part from appeasing opinion-forming newspapers such as itself.  In a 
revealing memo entitled ‘Getting the Right Place in History and not the Wrong One’, the adviser compared the 
‘new Labour brand has been badly contaminated’, was out of touch with popular opinion and that there was 
‘no shared agreement about what is the new Labour project for government’ (Sun 19th July 2000).  The 
exposure and existence of such frank advice somewhat undermined and contradicted its counsel for strong, 
determined leadership.  The perception of Blair as a vacilitating, polling conscious politician had been 
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reinforced by his actions (or rather inaction) and nowhere more so than in his failure to persuade a largely 
sceptical electorate about his professed belief in the merits of the Euro in advance of a referendum on British 
membership of it.  Now it was confirmed in a stark warning from an adviser who told the Prime Minister that 
his focus groups were indicating that ‘He lacks conviction, he is all spin and presentation, he says things to 
please people, not because he believes them‘ (The Sunday Times 11th June 2000). 
 
Gould’s instinctive populism was reflected in his preference for taking ‘tough’ rather than ‘soft’ positions and 
being ‘pro-family’ to guard against losing the support of the ‘mainstream majority’ and ‘middle Britain’ to the 
Conservatives because:  ‘People feel (the government) has put asylum seekers first, has put Europe first and 
has put minorities first’ (The Sunday Times 28th May, and 11th June 2000).  His analysis resembled that of 
Downing Street aide Peter Hyman and Dick Morris, the strategist responsible for popularising the strategic 
concept of ‘triangulation’ during his time working for Bill Clinton’s re-election.  Morris argued democracy was 
an increasingly ‘continuous’ rather than representative process in which centre-left candidates needed to 
disavow ‘ideological constructs’ and realign themselves with their principal (i.e. right-wing) opponents, 
particularly on issues where the rivals had a lead (Morris, 1999). The thinking behind triangulation concept 
was not dissimilar to Downs’ classic thesis on party competition and Dunleavy’s later work on ‘preference 
accommodation’ (Downs, 1957; Dunleavy, 1991).  Unlike Clinton Labour was comfortably ahead in the polls 
but this did not diminish the leadership’s preoccupation with cultivating Conservative inclined floating voters 
going into the 1997 election.  Yet this is far from the first time that those connected with the so-called ‘new’ 
Labour project have advocated the adoption a strategic approach similar to their ‘new’ Democrat cousins.  
This paper seeks to place the recent history, growing influence and role of focus groups within the wider 
leadership sponsored process of party reform.  It suggests that whilst contemporary journalistic scepticism 
provides an important check on some of the political claims made on the basis of qualitative data analysis, 
this has not always been the case.  Indeed it can be argued that certain media contributors have been 
complicit in endorsing the kinds of interpretations of public opinion studies favoured by the Labour leadership. 
 
The Legacy of the Policy Review. 
Campaigning played a significant role in changing and redistributing power within the Labour Party during the 
1980s so that, by the end of the decade, the organisation was unrecognisable from the one defeated in 1979.  
Far from being about peripheral presentational exercises, the adoption of a marketing driven approach 
became integral to the leadership's reassertion of control.  Furthermore this activity extended to influencing 
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popular opinion and was concerned with convincing the party of the need for reform.   The Policy Review 
process of 1987-91 began a process of ‘internal’ marketing that culminated in the launch of ‘new’ Labour in 
1994.   
 
The function of 'agenda-setting' is central to understanding how the Review and subsequent leadership 
exercises were able to restructure the party.  Cohen identified the core feature of this concept when he wrote:  
‘the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about’ (Cohen, 1963).  Having been popularised in a celebrated 
study of election campaigning, Lukes used the term to describe one of three 'faces' of power that determine 
organisational outcomes (Lukes, 1974).  Others adopted the concept in studying Labour decision-making 
procedures during the 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterised by 'crisis management' and a 
determined attempt by grassroots’ activists to diminish the power of the parliamentary leadership in order to 
reassert the right of the party Conference to make key decisions (Minkin, 1980; Koelble, 1991).  The body, 
labelled the 'parliament of the movement' by former leader and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, provided a 
delegatory form of self-governance embodying a commitment to internal democracy (Drucker, 1979).  This 
quality, largely absent from the other main parties, state institutions and most media organisations, helps 
explain Labour’s historic distrust of the latter in particular.  Significantly the modern party’s embrace of 
marketing has afforded the media considerable influence over internal Labour affairs with important 
consequences for what remained of the organisation’s federal, participatory structures. 
 
To better understand the changed nature of party organisation it is vital to consider the increasingly central 
role played by three ‘auxiliary’ institutions in shaping and determining decision-making outcomes.  Firstly, and 
most importantly, there has been the growth in size and importance of what Panebianco calls the ‘electoral 
professionals’ responsible for implementing and, increasingly, devising strategy (Ostrogorski,1902; 
Panebianco,1988).  With the emergence of this elite there has been a parallel growth in the party’s reliance on 
another auxiliary in the form of a select group of external media contacts.  In return for privileged access, 
these journalistic outlets have been responsible for the conduit of leadership viewpoints to general as well as 
internal party publics.  This is not a new phenomenon given it was Michels who at the beginning of the 20th 
Century made the telling observation:  ‘The press constitutes a potent instrument for the conquest, the 
preservation and the consolidation of power on the part of the leaders’ (Michels, 1962).  Finally, in terms of 
the input side to the debate, there has been an increasing preoccupation on the part of the electoral 
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professionals with floating voters.  Their attitudes, as determined by polling research, guided the leadership, 
its advisers and media contacts to the extent that this ‘opinion electorate’ of potential Labour supporters has in 
effect manifested itself as another potent force (Panebianco, 1988). 
 
Empowering the Electoral Professionals. 
During the Policy Review the media helped the leadership dominate the party agenda.  By doing so Labour 
was reconstituted as a more hierarchical, professional organisation.  Phil Kelly, the editor of Tribune,  
speculated on such an outcome at the beginning of the Review: 
 'If it becomes a mass party which takes it membership seriously, and involves them in policy-making 
and implementation, then it will need a system of internal management based on consensus.  If it 
descends into a media-orientated marketing organisation for top politicians, then it will need internal 
discipline which will make the fifties seem liberal by comparison.' (Tribune, 2nd September 1988) 
 
Prior to the late 1980s party agenda setting was understood to mean an ability to influence policy and 
organisational decisions through the mobilisation of internal opinion.  The increased importance of marketing 
complicated the process by intensifying politicians’ reliance on the mass media as a vehicle for persuasion.  
This in turn eroded the power of previously influential horizontal decision-making structures such as the 
Annual Conference.  Given its already privileged position, a Labour leader with coherent strategies now 
became virtually unassailable not least because: 
'His office now housed an unprecedented proliferation of aides, assistants and advisers, with an 
overview of, and involvement in, all aspects of party activity and all dimensions of the links with the 
unions.  In effect there was now an Executive Office of the Leader...  (providing) the basis of a 
centralised power structure unique in Labour Party history.' (Minkin,1992, 630) 
 
The incumbent leader Neil Kinnock’s burgeoning ‘executive’ was funded by the parliamentary subsidy of 
‘Short Money’ paid to opposition parties to enable them to fund research (Webb, 1994).  The beneficiaries of 
this resource were the personal aides, marketing consultants and Campaigns Director who formed what Shaw 
calls the 'strategic community'.  Increasingly it was these advisers, rather than those elected to the now largely 
titular National Executive Committee, who directed party affairs.  An obvious manifestation of this was the 
growing prominence and perceived importance of so-called ‘spin’ and ‘spin doctors’ (Shaw, 1994, 57-9). 
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Targeting the Media. 
The marketing conscious Review process involved targeting non-electoral groups including party members, 
donors and affiliates with an interest in policy and organisational developments (Shama, 1976; Kotler and 
Kotler, 1999).  The leadership was uniquely placed to co-ordinate a sustained public relations effort designed 
to influence internal audiences with the help of external media 'opinion formers'.  Unlike conventional politics, 
intra-party debates offer particular opportunities as well as challenges: 
'The mixture of intimacy and opposition is conducive to tensions, but when the interactions and 
relationships are distilled and exaggerated into news reports, the mixture is doubly explosive.  
Immediate relations are refracted through the prism of media publicity, itself often clothed in 
extravagant gladatorial imagery.' (Tiffen, 1989, 162) 
 
Before the Policy Review Labour agenda setting centred on influencing Conference and NEC decisions in 
tandem with a mediated debate which flourished in left journals like Tribune, New Statesman or the in-house 
Labour Weekly and New Socialist.  The latter two publications’ closure was symptomatic of the leadership’s 
concentration on the anti-Conservative Guardian and Daily Mirror newspapers for the dissemination of their 
reformist ideas from the late 1980s onwards.  During this time both papers, and contributors like Mirror 
political editor Alastair Campbell and Guardian correspondent Patrick Wintour in particular, were invariably 
supportive of Kinnock’s leadership and their advocacy helped frame broadcast media coverage of internal 
party matters.  The importance of these papers stems from their circulation figures:  throughout the early 
1990s these titles’ readerships both outnumbered the estimated Labour membership of 300-350,000.  Their 
organisational significance became obvious given an estimated 35% of those belonging to the party read the 
Guardian, 27% the Mirror/Record, 7% the Independent, 15% others and only 13% no daily (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1992, 37).  The two most popular papers were thus able to each reach a larger audience than the 
combined strength of the main Labour supporting publications Tribune, New Statesman, Labour Briefing, 
Chartist and Socialist/Red Pepper.  The latter group’s tendency to be more critical of the leadership than their 
mass-market rivals once mattered because of their opinion-forming, activist readerships yet their potential 
agenda-setting influence waned as the party abandoned its representative democratic structures in favour of 
membership ballots for parliamentary selections, leadership elections and constitutional or policy referenda. 
 
Researching the Opinion Electorate. 
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Private polling, that is opinion research commissioned by parties, is not new to British politics.  Nevertheless 
the importance attached to this form of data as a source of feedback was borne out by the increase in the 
amount as well as types of study being commissioned during the 1980s.  Parties that previously relied on 
quantitative opinion research methods such as the large-scale questionnaire now began funding ongoing 
qualitative studies of voter attitudes, typically in the form of a focus groups consisting of 6 to 10 people 
sharing a weak partisanship and/or similar socio-economic background.  In such sessions a trained moderator 
would facilitate a recorded discussion aimed at exploring participants' deeper value and attitudinal structures.  
Qualitative findings increasingly complemented quantitative electoral analysis because, as Neil Kinnock put it, 
they helped to 'get behind the figures' (Kavanagh, 1995, 145).  Parties have long used such research in their 
electioneering work.  The inter-war Conservatives held cottage coffee mornings to target women voters whilst 
Labour did the same through impromptu back street meetings.  Though primarily propagandist in intent, both 
offered potentially valuable feedback.  In the 1960s so-called depth interviewing of individual voters became a 
feature of campaigns.  Labour used the method to copy test advertisements in 1964.  A decade later leader 
Harold Wilson demonstrated his belief in the value of polling by commissioning so-called ‘psychographic’ 
based analysis from the party’s researchers MORI.  Interest in qualitative techniques intensified during the 
1980s with their use by Conservative strategists and the Save the Greater London Council campaign.  Even 
the chaotic 1983 Labour campaign involved some focus groupings. 
 
Labour’s use of qualitative research escalated during the mid-1980s with the succession of Neil Kinnock to 
the leadership.  Leslie Butterfield and Paul Southgate of advertisers Abbott Mead Vickers together with SRU’s 
Roddy Glenn presented their focus group based findings at a November 1985 meeting of an embryonic group 
of party sympathisers working in the marketing industry.  The then newly recruited Philip Gould was 
particularly impressed by the way the data and analysis highlighted the apparent disparity between popular 
attitudes and Labour’s perceived association with high tax, unilateralism and nationalisation (Gould, 1998, 50-
54).  Voters liked choice and were ‘completely divorced’ from the ‘a minority agenda of the emerging 
metropolitan left, of militant rights in welfare, race and gender’.  Younger women were worried about society 
breaking down and appeared introspective and primarily concerned about their families.  The researchers 
concluded ‘everybody wants to be middle-class these days’.  Gould was instrumental in formalising the 
relationship between Labour and its professional marketing supporters and to this end co-ordinated the 
Shadow Communications Agency of sympathetic expert advisors.   
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Early SCA research indicated there was significant voter antipathy towards so-called ‘scroungers’ and, by 
implication, Labour policies devoted to helping them.  In his first major qualitative based study for the party, 
Philip Gould argued its ‘minority agenda’ was a major electoral handicap (Gould, 1998, 49-50).  Consequently 
the subsequent 1986 Freedom and Fairness campaign was tailored to appeal to the burgeoning aspirational 
electorate.  The strategy for this was outlined to at a SCA presentation on the topic of ‘Society and Self’.  The 
Agency’s message was not universally welcomed.  Tony Benn was particularly alarmed by the meeting:  
‘Labour was associated with the poor, the unemployed, the old, the sick, the disabled, pacifists, immigrants, 
minorities and the unions, and this was deeply worrying’.  Benn was further troubled by what he saw as the 
proposed remedy of Thatcher style leadership:  ‘I came out feeling physically sick; I’m not kidding I felt unwell, 
because if this is what the Labour Party is about I’ve got nothing whatever in common with it’.  Signficantly 
alternative understandings or contradictory findings from the research data were invariably 'filtered' out of 
discussions (Benn, 1992, 442; Shaw, 1994, 63). 
 
The subsequent Policy Review ensured selected material from focus groups of floating voters became 
integral to debate because, according to Kinnock, the process had to be 'reinforced periodically by using the 
Shadow Communications Agency to give presentations which...assisted in the efforts to sustain the 
movement of the Review in the desired direction' (Shaw, 1995).  It helped that Communications Director Peter 
Mandelson had an understanding and interest in focus grouping arising from his time with television’s 
influential current affairs programme Weekend World in the early 1980s.  Speaking in December 1987 
Mandelson used qualitative research material to argue Labour was out of touch and associated with 'strange 
things', 'Marxists' and 'gays' (The Times, 6th December 1987; Macintyre, 1999, 74).  During the actual Review 
process opinion research based analysis was made available to those involved in the various policy group 
discussions.  Certain findings were particularly influential, notably the feedback suggesting large numbers of 
potential supporters discriminated between a ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.  Labour’s continued 
association with the latter implied traditional social democratic thinking or ‘Croslandism’ was now outmoded 
according to a key account of the period (Hughes and Wintour, 1990, 137-38 and 153). 
 
 
The ‘Modernising’ Agenda. 
The fourth consecutive defeat in 1992 triggered a further period of introspection within the Labour movement.  
The supporters of Kinnock launched a determined defence of his reform strategy during the immediate post-
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mortem period and beyond.  In doing so they used public relations and selective opinion research findings to 
influence the debate over the party’s future.  Brivati identified the two issues that defined their position: 
'The British Labour Party has a long memory and a conservative nature.  There are two key elements in 
its conservatism which have been the subject of controversy over the last thirty years and which the 
current leadership would like, in an ideal world, to reform.  The first is the link with the trade unions, 
particularly the block vote system.  The second is Clause IV of the Party's constitution.  Both are 
retained because of their historical importance rather than their contemporary relevance, and the 
modernisers in the party feel they are an obstacle to winning power.' (Brivati, 1993) 
 
The so-called ‘modernisers’ scored a notable coup by appropriating a name that had been fought over since 
the early stages of the Policy Review.  That they were able to do so was largely a result of the intensely 
mediated nature of modern internal party debates.  Like them, the modernisers’ journalistic sympathisers 
characterised their opponents as ‘traditionalists’, a negative term most in the party associated with 
conservatism.  Unsurprisingly many of those designated as such did not like or use the name and claimed it 
was they who were the authentic radicals with a modernising agenda (Hain, 1993a).  Nevertheless the print 
and broadcast media discourse couched the debate in terms of modernisers versus traditionalists, thereby 
giving the former added credibility.  Yet the terms were misleading if not meaningless as few Labour partisans 
were not prepared to countenance policy and organisational changes (Elliott, 1993).  To use more 
conventional terminologies, the debate was largely constructed through the mass media according to terms 
governed by a publicity conscious grouping on what can be termed the party’s ‘new right’ (Tribune, 21st July 
1995).  Significantly this faction differed from their Gaitskellite forebears as well as their contemporaries on 
the traditional Labour right in that its political identity was not based on conventional social democrat 
orthodoxies nor founded upon trade union backing.  Rather the new right wanted to transform the party by 
forging an electoral alliance based on middle class supporters, an accommodation with free market capitalism 
and the espousal of a rhetoric more commonly associated with the Conservatives.  By adopting the title of 
modernisers they effectively neutralised their main rivals’ ability to claim the mantle of the ‘left’ against their 
own less attractive but arguably more accurate ‘right’ label.  This proved an asset in a succession of debates, 
be they constitutional and concerned with the union link and Clause Four or more specific and related to 
events like the American Democrats’ 1992 electoral victory or the unexpected leadership contest of 1994. 
 
End of the Unions? 
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The 1992 election ended Neil Kinnock’s leadership but not what he had come to regard as ‘the project’ 
(Kinnock,1994).  In discussing the defeat most of his party rivals avoided attacking Kinnock personally and 
preferred to focus on the role played by the Shadow Communications Agency, a key agent of his reform 
strategy.  The SCA was, however, spared some criticism when this muted post-mortem was diverted by an 
'extraordinary fixation' with the union link ‘on the part of an influential minority who had important prompters 
and allies in the media’ (Minkin, 1992, 678).  Behind this sustained attack was a straightforward calculation: 
'Labour's social democrats used to argue that the block vote was a democratic measure representative 
of trade union opinion.  But once the union block vote swung against them, they complained that it was 
undemocratic and unrepresentative.  Perspectives change according to whether a practice helps a 
group win a struggle with challenges or not.' (Koelble, 1991, 126-7)  
 
Consequently, within days of the defeat, former Campaigns Directorate official Colin Byrne alleged 'behind the 
scenes fixing’ involving unnamed trade unionists who had long sought to undermine Kinnock (The 
Guardian,13th April 1992).  This coincided with reports that several general secretaries were supporting John 
Smith for the leadership.  Media attention turned to these affiliates’ role and the resulting coverage was almost 
entirely hostile.  An Independent editorial denounced the party-union link as 'constitutionally wrong' whilst a 
Sunday Times feature by Andrew Grice warned of 'The Red Barons Return' (The Independent, 13th April 
1992; The Sunday Times, 19th April 1992).  The unions were also accused of being 'rooted in the past', 
'undemocratic', a source of 'extremism' and having 'cloth cap' images (The Times, 19th May 1992; The 
Independent , 19th May 1992; The Independent, 12th June 1992).  The myth of the monolithic ‘barons’ was a 
persistent feature of journalistic reports but took no account of a more complex reality in which the affiliated 
unions were frequently divided over many issues (Minkin, 1992). 
 
Discussion over the union link began to dominate Labour’s post-mortem and thwarted a sustained reappraisal 
of Kinnock’s reform strategy.  Leaked findings from the party’s own private focus groups furthered the anti-
union media agenda.  Reports from sympathisers like Donald Macintyre reinforced the new right’s case:  
'Labour lost the election because floating voters saw it as union-dominated and outdated and because they 
believed voting for it was not in their financial self-interest, according to confidential post-election research 
circulating in the party's high command’ (The Independent on Sunday, 3rd May 1992).  Similarly Patrick 
Wintour of The Guardian wrote about 'devastating' feedback which suggested the party was 'too old 
fashioned, too tied to the past, too linked to minorities and old images of the trades unions'; the latter were 
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blamed for offering 'an old fashioned, bureaucratic image (to) key surburban swing voters' (The Guardian, 
12th June 1992;.  Other opinion forming papers reinforced the rapidly emerging consensus that Labour was 
‘backward-looking’ and identified with ‘industrial strife’, ‘the winter of discontent’, ‘inflation and economic 
failure’, ‘heavy industry’, ‘the traditional working class', ‘the past’, ‘downwardly mobile’ and ‘minority groups’.  It 
was argued that the ‘union interest' reinforced these negative associations (The Independent, 18th June 1992; 
The Financial Times, 18th June 1992; The Guardian, 20th June 1992).  At the behest of Philip Gould, Alastair 
Campbell contributed a likeminded article to the Daily Mirror; Campbell would of course later become a key 
lieutenant in the Blair leadership (Gould,1998,p.159).  Shadow Cabinet and NEC member Clare Short 
suspected the leaks were being used to divert attention away from the SCA’s flawed campaign strategy and, 
somewhat bizarrely, it was left to the Conservative supporting Daily Telegraph to point out the benefits of the 
party union link (Daily Telegraph, 22nd June 1992).  Stuart Weir detected an orchestrated attempt to 
scapegoat Labour’s founding allies: 
'During the election, the Conservatives tried to make Labour's links with the trade unions into an 
electoral issue and failed.  None of the polls picked up any signs of the trade unions damaging Labour's 
rosy image, and the first post-mortems by specialist writers entirely disregarded them.  But within a few 
weeks a highly influential group within the Labour Party had rewritten history.  They firmly identified the 
trade unions as the root cause of the electorate's distrust of Labour - apparently as the first stage of a 
campaign to break the party/trade union connection.' (Weir,1992) 
 
The immediate post-mortem failed to seriously address other possible negatives such as the so-called 
'Kinnock factor'.  This was a notable omission given the presidential nature of modern campaigning combined 
with this leader’s widely recognised unpopularity with voters.  This self-denial had, however, been unofficial 
policy as Philip Gould had consistently suppressed damning public feedback on Kinnock’s performance in 
successive strategic presentations out of loyalty to the leader (Gould, 1998, 144).  By contrast Gould showed 
no such reluctance in using a memo to apportion blame to those identified in the media post-mortem on the 
fourth defeat.  For him the ‘polling was clear’:  Labour was still a party of the ‘past’ (Gould, 1998, 158).  By 
contrast the official party report on the election, published the same month, was more cautious but came too 
late to influence the debate over the link.  It did however indicate that barely 7% of voters had mentioned 
unions as a reason for not supporting Labour.  The more common explanations given were general party 
image (30%); economic competence and tax (20%); Major and Kinnock (20%); and tax on its own (10%).  
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And whereas the British Election Study devoted attention to all four of these concerns, the unions’ role in the 
outcome hardly rated any sustained analysis in the book (Labour Party, 1992; Heath et al., 1994). 
 
One more heave?  The leadership of John Smith. 
The convincing victory of the leading traditional right-winger John Smith in the 1992 leadership election 
underlined how much the party had changed in a decade.  Smith’s consensual style contrasted with that of his 
more frenetic predecessor.  This was a reflection of his personality but also of the enormous powers 
bequeathed to him by Kinnock.  Smith moved quickly to disband the Shadow Communications' Agency and 
replaced it with a more formalised client-firm partnership.  In 1993 the party appointed former SCA volunteer 
Leslie Butterfield’s BDDH as its advertisers.  The agency assumed a relatively low profile in an arrangement 
designed to make the firm more accountable to the National Executive rather than the leadership.  To this end 
Smith allowed his senior colleagues ready access to the party's private opinion research where Kinnock had 
continually restricted the circulation of this material.  This did not, however, dramatically change a strategic 
outlook that still remained in the view of seasoned observer David McKie wedded to 'targeting middle income 
and Middle England' (The Guardian 29th April 1994). 
 
Labour enjoyed a period of relative calm and unity during John Smith’s leadership.  The re-elected 
Conservatives were soon besieged by crises arising from the European Rate Mechanism debacle and the 
government’s controversial mine closure programme.  Labour’s new right became agitated by what they 
perceived to be the leader’s ‘one more heave’ strategy despite having supported his candidacy against the 
more obviously radical Bryan Gould.  Journalistic sympathisers such as Andrew Grice and Martin Kettle acted 
as conduits for the group’s view on Smith's performance by focusing on his alleged unwillingness to give a 
lead in what was now a heavily centralised party (Sunday Times, 22nd November 1992; The Guardian, 3rd 
December 1992).  Yet the leader’s relaxed approach also enabled the new right to dominate the internal 
agenda and attract considerable media coverage for articles like the provocatively entitled 'Sleep Walking to 
Oblivion' (Raynsford, 1992).  In advocating further change, the group’s cause was to be further galvanised by 
a seismic political event overseas. 
 
 
The 'Clintonisation' of Labour:  the electoral post-mortem by proxy. 
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The debate over Labour’s defeat was initially side tracked into a manufactured but politically expedient row 
over the union link and in effect postponed the post-mortem.  This changed with Bill Clinton’s victory in the US 
presidential election of November 1992. 
 
The 'New' Democrats. 
Bill Clinton’s victory enabled the so-called 'New' Democrats to promote their agenda for government.  Their 
origins lay in the right-wing Democratic Leadership Council set up following the 1984 presidential election 
defeat.  The DLC believed their party had to shed its perceived ‘tax and spend’ image in order to establish a 
reputation for financial rectitude but critics feared this would consolidate the economic orthodoxy being 
established under Reagan (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986).  These Democrats also associated themselves with 
a less liberal penal agenda and developed policies to combat anti-social behaviour.  In the run-up to the 1992 
election Clinton underlined his own moral conservatism as Governor of Arkansas by executing a mentally 
incapacitated murderer.  His subsequent victory inspired Labour’s new right in a way their party’s fourth defeat 
had not.  Links had been forged when several headquarters’ staff visited the United States to support the 
Democrats’ campaign.  Former SCA co-ordinator Philip Gould also experienced the election and identified 
what he believed were the campaign’s key lessons for Labour.  Media reports interpreted them as the 
proposed ‘Clintonisation’ of the party (The Guardian, 6th November 1992).  Gould lauded the Democrats’ 
rebuttal of the Republicans claims about their tax policies and argued Labour’s inability to do likewise was a 
key failing of the 1992 campaign despite having advocated the need for a ‘rapid reactions unit’ in 1985 in his 
earliest report for the party (Gould, 1998, 55).  Gould was fulsome in his praise of Clinton’s key strategist 
James Carville and his flexible 'war room' which ensured quick responses to opposition claims.  The 
Democrats’ strategic clarity was enshrined in Carville’s phrase ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’.   
 
The Labour new right’s agenda was furthered by a conference on 'Clinton Economics' held at the beginning of 
1993.  The event featured Clinton strategists, American trade unionists and other analysts.  Pollster Stanley 
Greenberg explained the campaign had aimed to broaden the Democrats’ class appeal, emphasise the 
economy and sustain a critique of the government.  Strategist Paul Begala spoke of how:  'Clinton's genius 
was to understand that the Democratic Party did not operate on a Left/Right basis and he changed the nature 
of the dialogue to that of between the old and the new, between elitism and populism' (Transport & General 
Workers' Union et al., 1993).  Several British commentators argued the Americans offered Labour a blueprint 
for abandoning its image as 'a party of the poor and the past' by embracing the 'working middle-classes' 
 14 
(Independent on Sunday, 3rd January 1993; The Sunday Times, 10th January 1993).  Philip Gould and 
Patricia Hewitt launched the new right’s own journal Renewal with a widely reported article entitled 'Lessons 
from America'.  It suggested Labour needed to follow the Democrats lead by divesting itself of its ‘tax and 
spend’ image in order to develop a reputation for economic trustworthiness in order to win more middle-class 
voters (Gould and Hewitt, 1993).  The analysis, presented as something original, was in reality little different 
to that offered in the aftermath of the 1987 defeat.   More novel, but less commented upon, were the 
observations from some of the party officials who had worked on the Democrats’ campaign (Braggins et al., 
1993).  Following Clinton’s victory the leading Labour new right-wingers Gordon Brown and Tony Blair began 
visiting Washington to meet Democratic colleagues and Shadow Cabinet members began discussing 
fashionable American books like 'Reinventing Government' and its promotion of the 'enabling state' (The 
Guardian, 9th January 1993).  Shadow Home Secretary Blair cited the communitarian ideas of Amitai Etzioni 
and others associated with Clinton in formulating a ‘new’ political agenda.  He argued debates about major 
themes such as state versus market provision tended to overshadow the need for individuals to recognise 
they had responsibilities as well as rights and this informed Blair's more socially authoritarian 'tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime' rhetoric (Blair,1993). 
 
The Politics of Focus Grouping. 
Qualitative research methods became a more prominent feature of electoral analysis after the opinion polls’ 
had failed to predict the outcome of the 1992 general election.  Both politicians and journalists became 
increasingly interested in focus group data as an apparently scientific type source of some authority.  Labour 
MP Giles Radice, a long time supporter of Kinnock’s reform strategy, used the results of focus groups to 
explore public attitudes towards the party.  His autumn 1992 pamphlet Southern Discomfort drew on findings 
based upon discussions involving voters from five Tory held marginal seats in south eastern England 
(Radice,1992).  Participants had all intended to support Labour in the recent election but ultimately opted for 
the Conservatives.  These people were seen as particularly important because, in effect, they counted twice:  
the impact of losing one of their votes would be doubled if they supported the opposition.  The Southern 
Discomfort focus group evidence suggested these voters perceived the party to be out of touch, extremist, 
supportive of high taxation and antagonistic to their aspirations.  It usefully reinforced the impression created 
by the research findings leaked in the aftermath of the defeat which is hardly surprising given the firm of Philip 
Gould and his colleague Deborah Mattinson were responsible for conducting both pieces of research on 
which the analysis was based (Gould Mattinson Associates,1992).  Radice departed from the findings to 
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argue for the repeal of Clause Four of the party constitution, which embodied a commitment to public 
ownership, as a way of demonstrating that the ‘new Labour party’ was serious about change.  This call, not to 
mention selected contents of the pamphlet, gained widespread coverage in the media (for example, The 
TImes, 28th September 1992). 
 
The findings of Southern Discomfort were broadly endorsed in a confidential briefing from party Campaigns 
Director David Hill.  The contents of Hill’s leaked memo received considerable press attention when it 
appeared at the height of the Clintonisation debate.  His focus group based analysis offered further support to 
the new right case; this was understandable given the alleged source of the leak was Peter Mandelson.  Philip 
Gould also later admitted to having also passed material to the Sunday Times during this time following 
encouragement from Tony Blair.  For his part Mandelson had apparently obtained his documentation from 
NEC members Blair and Gordon Brown and passed it to his longstanding contact Patrick Wintour of The 
Guardian (Gould, 1998, 187; Macintyre, 1999, 240).  The subsequent front page scoop, headlined 'Losers' 
verdict divides Labour' and 'Leaked memo warns of voters' distrust’, went on to suggest voters felt the party 
was too beholden to the poor, minorities and other vulnerable groups (The Guardian, 5th January 1993).  
Wintour and likeminded journalists were keen to discuss the party’s credibility ‘problem’ at a time when it was 
enjoying a near record 20% lead in the polls.  It was ironic that the ‘modernisers’ should accuse their 
‘traditionalist’ opponents of being backward looking whilst simultaneously arguing that divisive events a 
decade ago were to blame for Labour’s predicament.   
 
The partial results of leaked focus groups produced skewed analysis around a narrow range of issues 
because, as critic John Prescott saw it:  ‘a political agenda can be pursued through the kind of answers you 
get in a poll which are reflecting the way a question is put’ (‘Walden’, broadcast on Independent Television 
network, 24th January 1993).  Others noted the absence of any significant commentary on Neil Kinnock’s role 
given his perceived unpopularity and past 'inconsistency over positions' (Tribune, 15th January 1993).  No 
sustained discussion of the leader's performance featured in Gould Mattinson Associates’ research for the 
Southern Discomfort study despite several participants having voluntarily mentioned Kinnock in response to a 
query about their attitudes towards the party (Gould Mattinson Associates, 1992).  By contrast there was no 
shortage of commentary on other aspects of the qualitative findings and this, together with almost uniform 
interpretation of the leaked research, hindered alternative understandings of voter opinion.  Most 
commentators failed to note that each successive instalment of focus group findings had in fact added 
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comparatively little and that the only novelty was provided by the sensationalism and degree of 'spin' in the 
reporting of evidence. 
 
Aside from the issue of data misrepresentation in the reporting of already selective findings, the inherent 
limitations of focus group methods and results were not acknowledged or discussed.  This did not stop 
political debate becoming saturated and distorted by choice quotes originating from qualitative studies.  The 
simplification of findings for media consumption obscured a more complex reality.  Reports also neglected the 
psychological dynamics inherent within focus grouping in that Radice’s and the party’s leaked research 
involved a narrow sample of Labour inclined but ultimately Conservative voters living in marginal seats.2  
Quite apart from the ability of the moderator to bias the discussion, these participants shared a need to justify 
and post-rationalise their decision to change allegiance during the 1992 election.  Furthermore following a 
pattern established before and during the Policy Review, much of the commentary reported from these groups 
was negative about Labour.  This animosity was interpreted as being exclusively aimed at the party rather 
than a wider (and widely mistrusted) political elite that included the Conservative government (on this support 
see Devine, 1992, 189).   
 
Marginalising the ‘Traditionalists’. 
Partial reports of focus group research findings continued to influence the parameters of the debate over the 
party’s future re-ignited by the Democrats’ victory.  Though they avoided using the term, those supportive of 
so-called ‘Clintonisation’ had a clear objective:  'The outbreak of public skirmishing over the relevance to 
Labour of Mr. Bill Clinton's US election victory is really coded debate about the extent to which the party must 
address the values and prejudices of the middle classes'.  For John Prescott this was part of an ongoing 
'battle for the soul of the Labour Party' underway against those 'obsessed with image rather than ideological 
conviction' (Financial Times, 11th January 1993).  The most thorough statement of the left position was 
contained in Peter Hain’s pamphlet What's Left which contended the trade union movement was a defensible 
'vested interest' and criticised the Labour new right’s devotion to mass mediation at the expense of a 
Gramscian style political education programme designed to combat alienation (Hain, 1993b).  Hain further 
argued the consequence of such activities would result in the party’s further detachment from its core 
working-class constituency and, by extension, the disenfranchisement these people from the democratic 
                                                 
2  For a defence of political focus grouping by a researcher involved in the original Southern Discomfort study  
see Cooper,1993.  Criticisms are offered by Gaber,1996; and Mitofsky,1996.  For more general methodological 
discussion see Morrison,1998; and Wilkinson,1998.   
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system.  And to this end the Clinton victory was crucial in that, according to Clare Short, it was being used 'to 
get rid of our old values, be embarrassed about the unions, and don't talk about the poor' (The Independent, 
11th January 1993).  
 
The trade unions’ potentially influential role in opposing Labour’s new right had inspired the mediated attacks 
on them following the fourth defeat.  Their legitimacy came under renewed scrutiny in the reporting of a 
special NEC Review Group convened to discuss the party union link over the summer.  The committee’s 
initially cautious suggestions were opposed by the new right and subsequently dismissed by The Guardian 
editorial as a 'shabby compromise' in favour of minority interests (The Guardian, 30th November 1992).  
Debate intensified throughout 1993 and culminated in John Smith’s proposed ‘One Member, One Vote’ for 
parliamentary candidate selections and leadership elections.  OMOV would remove the collective right of 
union branches to participate in these contests.  Smith together with unexpected support from the previously 
sceptical John Prescott forced change in what amounted to ‘a symbolic assertion of the will of the party 
modernisers, directed at the electorate.  Conducted in the rhetoric of democracy and modernization, the 
debate maximized the apparent independence of the party from the unions' (Lovenduski and Norris, 1994).  
The narrow margin of victory was helped by the increased voting strength of individual Conference delegates 
not to mention the continuously anti-union agenda setting in those newspapers favoured by Labour members.  
The growing influence of the media over the party’s internal affairs would be further demonstrated in an 
unexpected leadership contest. 
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Recapturing the Party: the New Right Triumphs. 
Following John Smith’s death Tony Blair emerged as the frontrunner to be his successor.  Blair’s rise to 
prominence had begun under Neil Kinnock and was greatly helped by Communications Director Peter 
Mandelson’s deployment of him as a television spokesperson (Sopel, 1995, 59-62, and 92).  The importance 
of this work was noted in a sympathetic profile that acknowledged how unnamed Blair’s critics portrayed him 
as 'a lightweight, just a creation of the Labour's marketing team' (The Guardian, 1st March 1993).  Yet such 
media recognition proved invaluable in establishing his leadership credentials. 
 
The 1994 Leadership Election. 
With mourning Labour politicians refusing to comment on the succession, Sarah Baxter of the Evening 
Standard filled the vacuum by becoming the first of many Westminster based journalists to make the case for 
'the Labour politician the Tories fear most'.  This was followed up by endorsements from media opinion 
formers including Trevor Kavanagh of The Sun, Simon Heffer in the Daily Mail, News of the World columnist 
Woodrow Wyatt, Martin Kettle of The Guardian, and Andrew Rawnsley in The Observer (Ali, 1994).  BBC 
reporter Steve Richards detected signs of a heavy 'spin' in, as well as on, this and similar features:  'The 
reports of Blair heading for an easy win were obviously based on little more at that early stage than a desire 
by most newspaper editors and political correspondents for such an outcome'.  Opinion polling evidence 
reinforced the perception that he was the prospective leader most likely to ensure a Labour victory at the next 
election (Richards, 1995).  The press amplified this message: 
'The media made a massive contribution to giving Blair a headstart over his rivals... The official 
moratorium in declarations of candidatures left the field entirely free for the media, in which Blair 
immediately emerged as a clear favourite.  The advantage Blair obtained from this early endorsement 
cannot be overstated; his cause had a virtually unstoppable momentum before nominations even 
opened.  The apparent certainty of his victory attracted contributions from donors who regarded his 
leadership campaign as part of a wider campaign for a Labour general election victory.' (Alderman, 
1995). 
 
When the official race began Blair, the new right candidate, could boast over half the parliamentary party as 
supporters and campaign contributions amounting to £88,000.  His centre-left rivals Margaret Beckett and 
John Prescott received fewer endorsements and only collected £17,000 and £13,000 respectively.  The 
electoral college involving approximately 400 MPs and MEPs, a few hundred thousand party members and 
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four million union and socialist society affiliates meant most participants would receive their information 
through the media rather than at party hustings.  This further advantaged the early frontrunner and weakened 
potential rival Robin Cook who was dismissed as lacking telegenic, voter friendly qualities.  Blair's 482 
appearances in national newspaper reports during the crucial weeks prior to the official race also dwarfed the 
182 of nearest rival Gordon Brown and discouraged the latter from standing (Franklin and Larsen, 1994).  The 
Blair campaign was organised by Jack Straw, Mo Mowlam and Peter Kilfoyle with discreet help from Peter 
Mandelson.  Mandelson took the codename 'Bobby' to conceal his presence and deter the kind of speculation 
that might have damaged the candidate's image.  Blair betrayed his psychological reliance on Bobby during 
the leadership campaign when he was filmed running away from a reporter’s questions on an industrial 
dispute.  Having taking advice from Mandelson on a mobile phone, Blair gave the journalist a diplomatically 
worded reply in order to ensure the potentially damaging footage was not aired (Jones, 1995, 159-60). 
 
The leadership race was a model of restraint and good humour by previous standards which, given the tragic 
circumstances, was understandable.  Consequently the press played a crucial role providing informed 
speculation and occasional controversy.  In the ballot Blair gained approximately 57% of the vote, winning a 
majority in each of the three parts to the electoral college.  Prescott became his deputy, unseating Beckett in 
a reversal of the result two years before.  The individual member and affiliated trade unionist majorities for the 
winner demonstrated the extent to which the transformation of Labour under Kinnock was more than surface 
deep and was a further tangible legacy of the marketing driven Policy Review.  Blair’s leadership was, 
however, founded upon a denial of this interpretation. 
 
 
Relaunching the Party (Again):  the Clause Four Debate. 
Tony Blair’s first major act as leader was to launch a debate over Clause Four.  Previously he had avoided the 
issue and during the leadership campaign had argued: 
'I don't think anyone actually wants the abolition of Clause Four to be the priority of the Labour Party at 
the moment.  I don't think that anyone is saying now, in the run up to an election, that this is what we 
should focus on.  The vast majority of the British people don't sit out there and debate the intricacies of 
the Labour Party constitution.' (On BBC1 television’s Breakfast with Frost, broadcast 12th June 1994) 
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Within three months of his election Blair changed his mind by claiming the Clause’s promotion of a more 
equitable society through public ownership was irrelevant and anachronistic.  In his first Conference address 
as leader, he declared 'Let us say what we mean and mean what we say' yet relied on press officers to brief 
journalists present that this meant he intended to re-write Clause Four (Riddell, 1997).  If Blair’s exhortation 
excited some media commentators it failed to move delegates two days later when a motion reaffirming 
Clause Four was passed by a narrow margin.  The Guardian headlined with 'Vote for past defies leader' and 
reported how the leadership had 'airily dismissed' the defeat (The Guardian, 8th October 1994).  The next 
time the subject was debated at a national Labour event the agenda would be considerably more favourable 
to the leadership. 
 
Many MPs including Tribune Group chair Janet Anderson backed the proposed change because there was a 
need to revise the organisational mission statement so as to ‘market the Labour Party... with a clear message 
of what we stand for’ (Tribune Group,1994).  Blair hoped a successful re-write would enhance his own status 
both within the party and without.  In this he was helped by a considerable organisational effort, sympathetic 
media coverage, an unfocused opposition not to mention a clearly defined objective.  Early MORI poll results 
in late January 1995 appeared to vindicate Blair’s position and suggested floating voters might be more 
inclined to support Labour if Clause Four was re-written (The Guardian, 26th January 1995).  This was, 
however, challenged by Gallup evidence two weeks later indicating 72% of voters surveyed had failed to 
recognise the Clause when shown it; interestingly 37% of the same sample endorsed the existing wording 
with 33% opposed and 28% undecided (Daily Telegraph, 6th February 1995).   The result, whilst inconclusive, 
suggested public ownership could even offer Labour a profitable campaign theme as columnist Keith 
Waterhouse argued: 
'What privatisation now means, in the public mind, is a license to print money to pay the bonanza and 
other jackpot benefits of chief executives.  Privatisation is now private in the sense of hands off, keep 
out.  And Tony Blair chooses this moment to tour the country persuading the brothers and sisters to 
ditch Clause Four.  Some sense of timing.' (cited in Philo, 1995)  
 
Most of the opinion research cited during the debate favoured the leadership’s position.  Giles Radice, aided 
by Stephen Pollard, had embarked on further focus group based analysis of key voter groups for the 
pamphlets More Southern Discomfort? and Any Southern Comfort?  Both advocated the dropping of Clause 
Four (Radice and Pollard,1993; Radice and Pollard,1994).  Research commissioned by certain trade unions 
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also reinforced the case for change by suggesting most members supported the proposed change (Tribune, 
3rd March 1995).  Taken with the conflicting Gallup data from the Daily Telegraph, the figures suggest the 
question was a determining factor. 
 
Tony Blair, and his deputy John Prescott redrafted and presented the new Clause Four during March in 
anticipation of a specially called conference vote six weeks later.  Their text made no mention of public 
ownership but included the phrase 'the enterprise of the market and rigour of competition'.  By then 91 CLPs 
had declared their support for the existing Clause Four.  The leadership responded by encouraging 
constituencies to ballots members and abandon the previously binding CLP Committee system of voting.  
Almost all of those who did this supported Blair (Tribune, 10th March 1995).  The only union to hold a 
plebiscite was the Communications' Workers Union and it affirmed the change though, like the constituencies 
that balloted, did not formally choose between the new and old versions.  Both The Guardian and Daily Mirror 
gave prominent coverage to the result.  Other union executives conducted their consultation exercises 
through the usual constitutional devices of meetings and workplace liaisons.  When Unison and the T&GWU, 
the two largest union affiliates, restated their commitment to the original wording, a Daily Mirror editorial 
denounced them as 'undemocratic' (Daily Mirror, 22nd April 1995).  Similarly those Labour MEPs who 
declared their allegiance to Clause Four with a front-page advert in The Guardian on the day Blair came to 
address them in Strasbourg were labelled 'Stalinist' in an editorial the following day.  Much was made of the 
leader's denunciation of those behind the advert as 'infantile incompetents' (The Guardian, 12th January 
1995).  By contrast most Westminster MPs were overwhelmingly supportive of the re-write, if only because 
some feared what would happen should Blair fail (Levy, 1996).  The press contrived to help strengthen the 
leadership’s case.  Thus the Scottish party conference decision to support Blair made The Guardian front 
page and merited an editorial whereas the Greater London region’s vote against change two weeks later 
received minimal coverage (The Guardian 11th March, and 27th March 1995).  The final decision lay with a 
special party meeting in April 1995 that voted in favour of the new version by 66% to 34%.  The leadership’s 
management of the debate combined with a sympathetic agenda setting press had been central to an 
outcome that greatly benefited and reinforced Blair’s position. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 22 
Following the fourth defeat of 1992 Labour’s new right, the self-styled ‘modernisers’, took care to subdue the 
electoral post-mortem into the wisdom of Kinnock’s reform strategy.  This they did through engineering an 
intensive and distracting debate over the party’s relationship with its trade union affiliates.  The new right’s 
case was reinforced by the leaking of selective focus group material to a group of media sympathisers willing 
to attack the link.  Thus anti-union posturing, together with the search for a new leader, dominated the party 
agenda in the immediate aftermath of the election.  The post-mortem and debate over Labour’s future was 
eventually resumed following Clinton’s victory.  Once again those pressing for reforms were well placed to use 
decontextualised quotes from qualitative research reports to provided journalistic contacts with ‘evidence’ of 
the need for further policy and organisation changes.  In doing so the new right demonstrated and reinforced 
the considerable influence of the external media and marketing techniques over the party’s internal affairs.  
The ‘auxiliary institutions’ of spin doctoring and focus groups had helped set the agenda in a succession of 
highly publicised Labour debates.   
 
The modernisation or, perhaps more accurately, 'marketisation' of Labour ceded more autonomy over party 
affairs than some MPs, activists and members appreciated or wanted.  Thus, by the time of the unexpected 
1994 leadership election, the new right’s favoured candidate Tony Blair was well placed to triumph because of 
his perceived popularity with the public and media.  Similarly popular and journalistic opinion underpinned 
Blair’s campaign to re-write the symbolically important Clause Four.  Ultimately both victories demonstrated 
the enduring legacy of Kinnock’s marketing driven strategy and its centrepiece Policy Review.  Arguably it 
was the process that did most to create what eventually became known as brand ‘new’ Labour and the 
circumstances that made Blair’s succession both more likely and possible.  It is further contended that the 
rightwards drift of this project was fostered by the almost recurrent media representation of selected themes 
that arose in the reporting of focus group material over more than a decade and, more specifically, in the 
crucial period during the early 1990s.  Crucially much of this commentary failed to apply the same journalistic 
scrutiny to findings based on qualitative work as they did to more conventional quantitative forms of research.  
Focus groups are unlikely to suffer in the way opinion polling did following the 1992 election.  It is precisely 
because of this that their usage deserves all the more close examination. 
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